COLVIN'S WEEKLY REGISTER.

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AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN. *(continued from page 223.)*—The next article that comes properly under examination, in my consideration of Monroe's treaty, is the fourth. A few general remarks on particular passages of the negociator's exculpatory letter will very appropriately precede.

As a very strong point of justification for having abandoned by the treaty the subject of impressments, col. Monroe says that our rights on that topic were expressly reserved, the discussion of which was postponed only for a limited time, solely for a special object, and to be revived as soon as that object was accomplished. In order that we should be under no misapprehension as to the nature of that *special object*, which was so transcendant that col. Monroe deemed it a satisfactory apology for procrastination on a vital point of the negociation, he informs us that it was the existence of those "Wars, which enforced the necessity of the most vigilant attention to the preservation and supply of the British naval force."

It requires a very small share of sagacity to perceive, that if the prevalence of war be a satisfactory reason for the continued refusal to do right, it is also a sufficient justification for the perpetration of wrong. The very principle upon which Great Britain refused to relinquish the practice of impressment is convertible; for if you once grant that the existence of war authorises that power to continue the seizure of our citizens, you likewise acknowledge that the same cause will exonerate her from the charge of bad faith when she had by treaty bound herself to good behavior and afterwards violated the obligation. It would remain for her only to say, 'Wars existed which enforced the necessity of the most vigilant attention to the preservation and supply of her naval force,' and agreeably to col. Monroe's understanding of the case, we ought, for that *special object*, and, (as he also says,) because the "refusal is made applicable to a crisis of extraordinary peril," to wave our rights for the time being, for her accommodation, and be thankful that we can obtain justice from her in any particular.

It has become very much the language of those who avow the opinion that Monroe's treaty ought to have been accepted, to exclaim, 'We never can expect the great nations of Europe to give way to our demands.' I have heard such language used on the very floor of congress; where, instead of depressing the national character, I think it ought to be elevated. But it is not out of place for those, who contend that we ought to have acquiesced in a degrading compact, to endeavor to swell the grandeur of that foreign nation to whom they wish us to submit. With some men the splendor of a tyrant may render his acts of oppression less odious; but for myself, I hold it much more honorable to contend for justice with a superior power than with an equal; for it has some appearance of spirit, and demonstrates that we are not so much the creatures of a mercenary passion as we are tenacious of our rights from a principle founded in the most noble feelings of the heart.

Col. Monroe is the author of this

kind of apology for the treaty, by admitting the arguments of the British to be conclusive as to their right during the existence of war, in a case of necessity, to exercise the power of impressment. And what will appear to any reflecting person extremely strange, the colonel declares the informal professions of the British government respecting our seamen, not only "safe and honorable for the United States to admit," but that they afforded "reasonable expectation that the accommodation would be hereafter yielded." If such are the serious thoughts arising in the mind of col. Monroe, all I can politely say to it is that his reason is not my reason; nor (I am bold to venture the assertion) the reason of experience, or of the people of this country. When we recollect that the British commissioners, according to the colonel's own confession, declared that the king was not prepared to surrender the claim or practice of seizing mariners on board of our ships, that they would introduce into the treaty no satisfactory stipulation by way of security to us, and that they expressly maintained the privilege on the principle of necessity, growing out of existing war; what "*reasonable* expectation" was there that "the accommodation would be hereafter yielded?" Mr. Key declared with great solemnity the other day, that Great Britain would not even observe treaties when it was her interest to break them: Indeed he represented her (as well as France) a faithless, treacherous nation. The gentleman has had some opportunities of knowing the English; and although I am not perfectly satisfied that he has sufficient cause to justify him for speaking of them in so virulent a style, yet I believe him to be mainly correct in his opinion. If, then, Great Britain will not pay regard to her solemn treaties, who can believe she would be bound by mere professions? If a written bond will not bind her, what reliance can we have on her parol?

It is almost inconceivable how col. Monroe labors to establish the position that the informal arrangement respecting the treaty was a good one. "It presumes (says he) a want of provision in the written documents connected with it, which is supplied by mutual explanations and *confidence*." This artful interpretation is given, in order to impress the mind with the notion that the informal understanding between the American and British commissioners was, in reality, to fill up the chasm in the treaty on the subject of impressments. In truth the colonel insinuates that it was nearly the same thing as if it were inserted formally in the treaty: "Reduce the transaction to form (he observes) and it besomes a treaty." But we find the British were too cunning to reduce it to form, rather choosing to place it on the basis of "mutual explanations and *confidence*." That fatal word "*confidence*," destroys the whole charm of col. Monroe's logic. How could we confide in a government uniformly treacherous? If Great Britain had meant to deal fairly with us, why did her commissioners refuse to insert in the treaty a warrantee for the performance of her informal promises? It is ridiculous to suppose that they had no reason for doing so. They understood the lesson of the English school too well to act the part from whim. From first to last they resisted our claim to exemption from impressments, and only evaded a positive denial by an equivocal arrangement, for the observance of which we

had no security but "*confidence.*" By such informal understanding col. Monroe conceived that the British were "*bound* not to tresspass." Where was the *bond?* "Positive assurances," "mutual explanations and *confidence*" were the only obligation. What was our remedy if they violated their "positive assurances," and abused our "*confidence?*" Why says the colonel, "*if* she *did*, (as if the thing were doubtful) the United States could appeal to *force!*" The capability of appealing to force, is thus stated as an apology for leaving the subject of impressments upon an informal footing. But it is singular enough that what is advanced in one shape to console us for the loss of a great right is offered in another form to intimidate us into submission. Col. Monroe congratulates us that if Great Britain did not observe her engagements we could fight her; and then laments that "the alternative (if we did not accept the terms offered) was to break off all negociation, with the two countries in a hostile attitude;" and avers that he "knew the United States were not prepared for war; that their coasts were unfortified, and their cities in a great measure defenceless; that their militia in many of the states was neither armed nor trained; and that their whole revenue was derived from commerce." And yet, "*if* G. Britain *did* tresspass, the United States could appeal to *force!*"

On this kind of reasoning, inconsistent as it is, col. Monroe places very great stress. He does not seem to have reflected, that for that appeal to force which he argues we could resort to in case Great Britain did not observe her promises, we should be as much unprepared as we are at present.

But what may seem still stranger in a man of the colonel's reputed energy of character, is this passage of his letter: "When I took into view the prosperous and happy condition of the United States, compared with that of other nations; that, as a neutral power, they were almost the exclusive carriers of the productions of the whole world; and that in commerce they flourished beyond example, notwithstanding the losses which they occasionably suffered, I was strong in the opinion that those blessings ought not to be hazarded in *such a question.*" Now what was that question? The *seizure*, the *enslavement* of our citizens. Personal liberty, the most precious enjoyment of human nature, is by the colonel put into the scale with commerce, and the latter in his opinion preponderates. If, indeed, the time is come, when *gain* has so far corrupted us, that we can even delay one moment to calculate between the rights of the citizen and the profits of trade, we are a corrupted and a ruined nation. Such principles once fairly entertained by the people; and they will very soon be incompetent to protect that wealth for which they so anxiously sigh. Like capons, they will only fatten for the enjoyment of some voracious conqueror; and whilst they are flattered by their growing size, they will only be approaching nearer to destruction.

Somewhat different from colonel Monroe's were the sentiments of those illustrious men who first projected the American revolution. Whilst under legal subjection to G. Britain, they deemed it preferable to sacrifice life and fortune in the maintenance of rights less dear than that for which we now contend as an independent nation, than to sit quiet-

ly down under wrongs, and grow rich and contemptible. It is very certain that no nation can long enjoy prosperity that does not on all proper occasions manifest a spirit resolute in the vindication of its honor and dignity. The history of the world is full of impressive examples, that republics and kingdoms have invariably sunk into insignificance and become the prey of some desperate adventurer, so soon as public spirit declined.

Such an opinion, entertained by an American negociator, completely unmanned him for urging our claims with ardor. "*Strong* in the *opinion*, that those blessings [of commerce] ought *not* to be *hazarded* in *such* a question," with what kind of firmness could he advance to the discussion of the subject? Already convinced in his own mind that the *liberty of our seamen* must give way if their rights came in competition with our commercial advantages, he was prepared at the very moment of entering upon negociation, to give up the point. The British are keen and cunning enough in affairs of diplomacy; and they no doubt discovered the impressions of col. Monroe's mind on this subject. In which case they had only to resist the demand respecting our seamen, glossing it over with a few *most positive assurances*, and interlarding it with expressions of *confidence*, and colonel Monroe, from his "*strong opinion*" that nothing was even to be "*hazarded*," was ready to yield the question upon an informal understanding.

There might be some color of apology for this opinion of col. Monroe, if indeed he had, after relinquishing the rights of the seamen, secured by the treaty that flourishing commerce of which he appears so tender: But surely, when some of the greatest benefits of our extensive trade were signed away, it would have been discreet at least not to have insisted upon it so strongly as an excuse for a failure in other particulars.

It must not be overlooked, that these apologetic strictures of the ex-minister, derive their principal force from another opinion which he cherished. He believed in the event of the negociations being broken off without making some kind of treaty, that "War seemed the inevitable consequence of such a state of things," To prove the correctness of this position, he argues in the following way; "The attitude which the governments held towards each other was in a certain degree hostile. Injuries had been inflicted by one party, and resentment shown by the other, the latter having taken a step in the case of the non-importation law, which was intended to vindicate the public rights and honor by being made the means of obtaining a redress of those injuries." The air of ridicule which is thus attempted to be thrown upon the non-importation law, by calling it a measure "which was *intended to vindicate the public rights*," is unworthy of the sedateness of a man of colonel Monroe's high standing. It is very palpable from the provisions of that law that it was never intended to *vindicate* our public rights; for it merely goes to a partial exclusion of British manufactures. The true intention, as I believe it has been universally understood, was to *manifest a sensibility of the wrongs* from Great Britain, by intimating to her what we would do if she persisted in her improper course of conduct. It certainly was not an *hostile* act; but viewed strictly, could be interpreted

into nothing more than a commercial regulation, to which Great Britain was at full liberty to oppose countervailing regulations; And moreover, every disposition was manifested by our executive to prevent its operation altogether if the British would return to a due sense and observance of justice towards us. But the fact which completely destroys the plausibility of col. Monroe's suggestion that war would immediately have taken place, exists at this moment. The non-importation law has been enforced, an embargo has been laid, all negociation for a treaty seems to be at an end, yet Great Britain has not made war upon us.

One curious circumstance will forcibly strike the reader in the conduct of colonel Monroe; which is this: That he should depart from the tenor of his instructions, and take upon himself the responsibility of making a treaty. He seemed at London to be completely at variance with our administration in all its views. The non-importation law fell dead-born from the American legislature; for their minister kept it altogether out of view in his negociations at St. James. In stating his reasons for this, the colonel observes: "The measure was intended for the ministry of Mr. Pitt, from whom the injuries were received, but by the removal of that ministry, and the delay which took place in the passage of the law [thanks to his friend Mr. Randolph] it came into operation against the ministry of Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, who would not have rendered those injuries, and against whom of course such a weapon would not have been raised." It is the wrong view in which col. Monroe persists in considering the non-importation law, that forms his only apology for not bringing it into view in the discussion of differences. It seems that it presented itself to him as a *hostile, vindictive weapon;* when in fact it was only contemplated to *exhibit* the *feelings* of the United States at the conduct of Great Britain; and in that aspect it might have been pressed upon the ministry of Charles Fox as well as upon that of Pitt and Grenville. Might he not have said to the former, "My government has passed a law which manifests a degree of sensibility at the injuries done the United States by the British: The continuance of such conduct may probably increase that sensibility to a high state of irritation. It will be well to consider whether it is for the interest of your nation to work her up to such a temper, or by refraining from its evil practices conciliate the good will and reap the rich fruits of American friendship." This, however, was not the idea of col. Monroe. "It was *impossible* (he says) to appeal to the non-importation law as a strong motive of action with the new ministry." And wherefore?—Because, as he avers, "it would have lost us all claims on the generous feelings and liberal policy, which the new ministry was believed to indulge and disposed to adopt towards the United States." The event has shown us what reliance was to be placed on the *generous feelings* and *liberal policy* of those new ministers. Nothing more was to be got from them than from their predecessors; and it was in vain to look to them for any thing like *generosity* or *liberality*. They might have been a little more *polite*, but in all the *essentials* of a treaty that should have been for mutual benefit, they were as inexorable as Pitt himself.

It is worth while to attend minute-

ly to a few of the particular reasons which induced col. Monroe to conclude the treaty without any provision respecting impressment. After asking, "Had it been practicable to terminate the negociation, without such an adjustment as that proposed, and without taking any decisive measure, *what was to become of the non-importation law?*" he tells us "a sincere desire to *afford to the administration an honorable opportunity for its repeal*, since, under existing circumstances, it did not seem probable that it could be longer useful and might be injurious, was a strong motive with him to incur the responsibility which he took on himself in that transaction." Here col. Monroe not only departed from his orders, not only went directly counter to the views of his own government, but actually undertook to decide on the merits of a law, and to say in the face of congress and the executive, that it was not only *useless*, but *injurious*, and that in order to afford the administration an *opportunity* to *get off* with *honor*, he was in a great measure induced to enter into the stipulations of the treaty. I profess not to understand this kind of logic. If the non-importation law was *useless*, it could be of little consequence whether it was repealed or not; and as col. Monroe did not choose to bring it into view in the negociation, how could it have been a stumbling block in his way? But with respect to that law, does not the colonel rather contradict himself? "G. Britain (he says) it was known, would enter into no arrangement, by treaty, which did not provide for its repeal." And yet it was *useless!* Surely, if the British made it a *point* not to make any treaty unless the law was repealed, they must have considered its existence of considerable importance: And notwithstanding what our ex-minister says to the contrary, I am decidedly of opinion that the non-importation law had more effect on the minds of the English commissioners than all the representations of col Monroe.

From the letter of the colonel, to which, in my examination of the treaty I shall frequently return, I proceed to the fourth article of that ill-fated instrument. It is couched in the terms of the 14th article of the former treaty. It allows to the subjects of G. Britain the privilege of settling and carrying on trade in any part of the U. States on terms *equal* to those enjoyed by our own citizens. But, mark the contrast! to American merchants it only grants similar privileges with regard to the United Dominions of G. Britain: There, indeed, we may reside, and carry on business; But from the British *colonies* we are excluded: We cannot become domiciliated in them: Our unhallowed feet, in the way of permanent residence and the benefits of reciprocal privileges, are not permitted to tread her colonial possessions; which are the only portions of her empire where it is worth the while of an American to settle himself. The reader may form some estimate of this privation, when he is told that the law of Jamaica compels strangers *to employ and pay a heavy commission to their resident merchants.* —Now I demand what solid reason there does exist, why we are to permit British subjects to enjoy all the advantages to be derived from the free prosecution of trade in the United States, whilst the citizens of the latter are restricted in their intercourse with the most valuable possessions of the former? I do not know that any mitigation could have been procured on this subject; but surely

such unequal terms in favor of our rival might have made colonel Monroe a little more strenuous in his efforts to procure some certain arrangement with respect to seamen. But it seems he did not stop to compare notes; but whilst he was bargaining away the principal enjoyments of this country, without an equivalent, consoled himself with the illusory conception that he was securing "the prosperous and happy condition of the U. States."

The fifth article differs only from the fifteenth article of Jay's treaty in settling those points which related to discriminating and countervailing duties, by admitting the United States to impose on British vessels a tonnage duty equal to that which is by American vessels payable in British ports; and by repealing all discriminating and countervailing duties heretofore imposed by either. The tonnage duty already enforced by our laws, is conceived to be right as far as it goes. But it is questionable whether the words of the article will authorize the imposition of duties by us equal to the town and port duties payable by foreign ships entering the ports of Great Britain. If they will not, those of themselves will be heavy charges on our navigation; none like them being payable by British ships in our ports.

For a very full investigation of the effect that the present discriminating and countervailing duties would have on our navigation in time of peace, I must refer to the report of the committee of commerce and manufactures, made to the house of representatives in the year 1802, by which it appears to be proved that the British have secured to themselves the carrying of all the tobacco, cotton, rice, pot and pearl ashes; and that it is believed that the owners of British ships being made certain of a freight of those articles from the United States, they would willingly accept of half the usual freight payable on dry goods; and thereby the American ships would be effectually excluded in a short time after peace, from carrying to or from Great Britain for the mutual wants of either country. On the other hand, there can be no doubt were the ships of each placed on equal terms as to expence, that a decided preference will always be given to our own over the shipping of any other nation. There is no question but we could carry on terms quite as low.

The fifth article omits to provide against the extraordinary duty imposed by Great Britain on goods exported to the United States *more* than that which is imposed on similar goods exported to the nations of Europe; which, at the time the treaty was made, was about four per cent. payable by the United States, when only one and an half per cent. is charged to other nations. This very thing was one of the great objects of the extraordinary mission to Great Britain; and its not having been specially provided against, would have been a strong reason for not ratifying the treaty. No treaty in fact ought to be entered into with any nation, by which it was not provided that with regard to export as well as import duties, we should be placed among the most favored. What is the fair and candid construction when no such provision exists? We acquiesce: We admit the imposition to be just: And if right as to four per cent. where is it to stop? Great Britain may, and (if her wants increase) she will increase it to any amount which she may deem safe and advisable as it

regards a competition with France in similar goods. The precedent which we have in this case may prove to us what they will do by what they have done. The duty began by a convoy tax of one per cent. When peace took place it was transformed into an export duty, and increased to four per cent. This oppressive, this unjust duty, cost the U. States much more than half a million of dollars annually.

As the sixth article offers no kind of advantage to our citizens, it might just as well (for all the service it can be of to the United States) have been entirely omitted. *Not so to the British.* To them it secured the existing state of the intercourse between the United States and their West Indies, and precludes us from taking any measures that may tend to promote the employment of our vessels by restrictions on their vessels employed in that trade or by extra-duties on their West India products, so as to compel the islanders to meet our vessels at some intermediate port for the supplies which their islands will always require from the United States. We ought not perhaps to attach much importance to this object. It will, however, serve to show how well the British understand to provide against even possible injuries to them. They grant to us no favor in the W. Indies and prevent us from taking any coercive measures against them. It does not seem that the general provisions concerning the trade between the two countries can be construed to comprehend the trade between the continental colonies of Great Britain and the United States: The provisions or stipulations are in the words of the former treaty, which have already had a construction.

The subject will be resumed in my next number.

"WHAT'S IN A NAME?"—It has been a prevalent fashion to say, that names are nothing; and quoting Shakespeare for authority, we are very prettily told, "*that which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.*" Now this, abstractly, is true enough: But uniform experience teaches us, that names represent certain ideas, which ideas in our minds have distinct qualities affixed to them.

To the name *American* I have always attached the qualities of *honor, justice, liberality*, &c. and I am always sorry when I see or hear of any thing that tends to give to the name a contrary character. It is, therefore, that I perceive with the deepest regret the federal party in New York calling their ticket the *American* ticket, which they have got up for the approaching election. That party having disgraced every name they have assumed, rendering it odious and contemptible, I am apprehensive of a similar fate for the name *American*. I know, indeed, that calling certain animals *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, does not lessen the reputation of those old Romans: But then we must recollect that they are *dead characters, embalmed in history*, and hence cannot be injured by any degrading appropriation of their names. The *American* name is, it may be said, yet forming, and may be materially injured by such acts as the fedaralists resort to. It is really a serious thing in a national point of view; and if they presevere in it the distinctive term by which we are known may hereafter cast a kind of infamy upon us.

Gentlemen who are derious of subscribing to the *Weekly Register*, are informed that they can be provided with the numbers from the commencement.

For Colvin's Weekly Register.

THOUGHTS

ON A PLAN OF ECONOMY (SUITED TO THE CRISIS OF 1809) FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Friends and Countrymen,

The jealousies that followed Columbus and all our enterprizing ancestors to the western world, though sometimes suspended, are again at work to check the rapid growth of *the second commercial nation of the universe.*

We feel for our fishermen, for our seamen, and for all our fellow citizens, whose commercial avocations are now interdicted by the arbitrary mandates of European powers at war.

But *perhaps* in the sequel it will be found, as in our former struggle for independence against *similar insults*, that those who have attempted to injure us will alone have cause to repent their temerity. If alive to our duty, we are prompt in our preparations to meet or to bear momentary privations in a few articles in dress we may ultimately gain by momentary losses.

Is it not obvious that the causes which tempted many of our ancestors to change their original occupations for agriculture were the result of calculations, by which it was manifest that wherever prime lands were attainable at less than one tenth of their tested and acknowledged value, by the experience of Europe, the value of labor thereon may be proportionate to the difference or to the savings of the purchaser. Hence every prudent emigrant to our new country, has preferred to labor on his own farm if he had either the means or the credit to procure one at the prices, common to this, but unknown in any country in the old world. Perhaps this, the original cause of our preference given to agricultural labor, is yet unknown to those Europeans who are endeavoring to effect a change, that time and a consequent increase in our population would have produced without their aid. Already we see, in some of our cities, and in all those parts of our country that have a population of above thirty persons to a mile, a great addition to the few mechanical trades that were originally necessary to aid agricultural plans of primary importance. While we were gainers by a fair exchange of food, of cotton, &c. for luxuries, with agents for the cold and hungry manufacturing citizens of Europe, we were pleased with a commerce that FED THE HUNGRY AND CLOATHED THE NAKED; while we carried to Europe and their dependencies food for more persons than are annually employed in Great Britain, *in all their manufactories*; when we took in return therefor, articles that they could well spare with the chief benefit to themselves: *And yet we are checked in this! the principal result of our commerce!* in and its relations to those who now endeavor to restrain our growth *by starving their own citizens!* But if an ERSKINE with all his eloquence and with his incontrovertible truths, was unheard, the voice of an American will have no effect to restore reason to Europe, or to promote an *unfashionable* effort for the freedom of commerce, to increase the numbers, the industry, the wealth, and the harmony of mankind.

would be easy to swell this introduction by new arguments to place the folly of the belligerent powers in a stronger light, but this is not my present object: It is to shew from new but solid data, that for some of the principal manufactures of Europe we are already ripe, from the ascertained increase and still rapidly increasing population, doubling in less than twenty-three years; by which in many instances the enhanced value of land near our principal cities, and for some entire states, has rendered agriculture less profitable for the capital and stock employed than many branches of manufacture suited to our country both for our consumption and commerce.—To point out these, and to select the few that are the best suited to *joint stock* institutions, with a chance for profit even if a sudden reverse of the present restrictions should promote a return of our commerce with Europe, is the main object now in the view of the writer of this essay. The merits of which, if any, can only be known by a full investigation of the facts on which the whole must finally depend.

I shall here offer a few statistical views shewing the last year's increase of the United States in their population and general wealth, with several years exports, &c. for on these views the arguments I have to offer will chiefly depend. The table B will evince the truth of my assertion that we have exported provisions sufficient for all the persons employed in manufactories in Britain, green vegetables and milk excepted. The entire manufactories of Britain are now equal to 350 millions of dollars, of which they consume near 170 millions at home; and during the last year only sold to us near 40 millions of dollars, of which one third were in all kinds of cotton goods, from our own staple. The whole of the cotton manufactured in G. Britain, in 1807, was but little more than equal to half of their last year's importation, viz. 60 millions of pounds; half of which was again exported. Ten millions of lbs. of cotton, which did not average to the planter more than 20 cents, or two millions of dollars for the whole, was the entire quantity necessary for the 13 millions value in cotton goods that we imported the same year: But as the manufacturer at Manchester paid 40 *cents on an average*, or *one hundred per centum* on the original American cost, the prospect for a saving by our home manufactory would be obvious, even if the sum of twenty-five per centum, a fair average for the charges of insurance, of freight, of commissions, and of custom-house duties on importation, were not included. These charges of 25 per cent. are common to other imported goods; but the great saving on the raw materials is confined to cotton goods and to hats made of American furs, to gloves of American peltry, and a few articles of little value compared with those of which our own cotton is the staple, and the amount imported near one third the value of all we receive from Great Britain. That these estimates may be better understood, the following tables are presented in order to assist in our important enquiry.

Should an investigation of the facts on which these thoughts are predicated ever become fashionable, the business of legislation, of public and of private economy, will become plain to many who are now so much at a loss how to direct their patriotic and social dispositions and exertions, that *they dare do nothing, lest they should do wrong.*

A summary statistical table of the population and general wealth of the United States, for the years 1806 *and* 1807.

		1806.	1807.
Territories of the U. States, *with Louisiana*,	acres	1,280,000,000	1,280,000,000
Free persons	persons	5,305,000	5,460,000
Slaves,	do.	1,060,000	1,096,362
Freed persons of color,	do.	138,000	147,000
Births,	do.	330,000	345,000
Deaths,	do.	159,000	164,000
Total population,	do.	6,365,400	6,556,362
Total increase, yearly, 3 *per cent.*	do.	185,400	190,962
Persons to each mile,	do.	3	3
Dwelling houses,	houses	1,245,000	1,290,000
Colleges,	number	20	22
Academies,	do.	45	57
Improved lands,	acres	39,860,000	39,990,000
Average price cultivated,	cents	625	630
Ditto in their natural state,	do.	225	230
Horses,	number	1,245,000	1,300,000
Horn cattle,	do.	3,000,000	3,200,000
Toll bridges,	do.	38	48
Turnpikes and canals,	do.	70	82
Militia,	men	1,145,000	1,200,000
Navy U. S.	vessels	28	90
Seamen,	men	67,000	69,000
Tons shipping,	tons	1,397,265	
Imports,	dollars	104,000,000	107,000,000
Exports,	do.	103,787,236	108,343,225
Insurance companies,	capital	15,200,000	17,000,000
Average labor per day,	cents	75	75
Ditto wheat per bushel,	do.	120	115
Revenue,	dollars	15,559,936	
Expenditure,	do.	15,021,104	
Metalic medium,	do.	18,500,000	20,000,000
Banks,	number	83	86
Bank capital,	dollars	48,500,000	50,000,000
Bank notes circulating,	do.	17,000,000	18,000,000
Nominal public debt,	do.	97,223,099	96,462,752
Sinking fund and reimbursements,	do.	28,519,428	31,369,709
Cash in the treasury,	do.	4,538,105	9,643,842
Custom house bonds,	do.	19,553,890	
Total valuation U. States,	do.	2,511,000,000	2,518,000,000
Public lands sold,	acres	2,385,000	2,669,994
Proceeds public lands,	dollars	4,959,155	5,547,865

TABLE CONTINUED.		1806.	1807.
National Funds, viz.			
Active Sinking fund,	dollars	17,113,835	18,347,580
4500 lots in Washington city,	do.	1,500,000	1,500,000
Western public lands, above,	acres	250,000,000	250,000,000
Louisiana lands, above,	do.	600,000,000	600,000,000

TOTAL *consumption of all the foreign merchandize only, within the United States for the year* 1807, *from known facts and from estimates on the experience of the last five years; rated at the prices at which they were sold to the consumers.*

Merchandize, dutied ad valorem at 12 1-2 to 22 1-2 per centum	49,505,000	Geneva	850,000
		Brandy	3,300,900
Nails and Spikes	520,030	Wines	3,126,480
Lead and manufactures of lead	358,290	Teas	2,608,660
Steel, &c.	336,000	Coffee	2,644,382
Beer, ale and porter	155,500	Sugar	5,027,630
Cheese, British and Dutch	43,000	Molasses	2,917,220
Boots and Shoes	171,840	Cotton	32,080
Coal	72,600	Pepper	206,000
Salt	1,506,000	Indigo	266,000
Rum and spirits	5,103,000	Pimento	54,000
Cocoa	136,000	All other articles	4,000,000
Hemp	960,000		
Total,			83,876,618

Although the total consumption at the cost to the consumers may amount to 86,000,000 dollars, near 20 per centum of this sum was realized in profits by our own trading citizens. The net cost of goods, or the sum paid for them in Europe, was not more than $69,000,000; but as this was more than 10 dollars a head for our population, then amounting to above 6,500,000 persons, *the times* require we should think of the best mode to save as much of this sum in future as we can, and by the easiest and most salutary mode in our power.

In the table *classing all our occupations* we have included above 400,000 persons who are but *nominal* AGRICULTURALISTS, for their aversion to their present line of labour. If half of these could be persuaded to become manufacturers in either of the useful branches, *open for their choice*, our country would be *completely independent*. Other useful changes will take place of course, agreeably to the prospects, dispositions, and necessities incident *to the present times*.—A recent report to Parliament from some of the principal British merchants, has made their exports to the U. States of America 10 millions sterling; but with all due respect for their estimates we find they have exceeded the sum above six millions of dollars on the last year, in which these exports were greater than at any former period.

Domestic Exports U. S. comparing the product of 1791 with the last 5 years, from official documents, valued in dollars U. S.

PRODUCE OF THE SEA.

Year.	Dried Salt Fish.	Pickled Fish.	Whale Oil and Bone.	Spermaceti Candles.	Total of the Sea.
1791	1,200,000	200,000	196,480	60,000	$1,656,480
1803	1,620,000	560,000	280,000	175,000	2,635,000
1804	2,413,256	639,419	311,028	69,720	3,433,423
1805	2,058,000	348,000	314,000	163,000	2,884,000
1806	2,150,000	366,000	418,000	182,000	3,116,000
1807	1,896,000	302,000	476,000	130,000	2,804,000

PRODUCE OF THE FOREST.

Year.	Ginseng and Peltry.	Naval Stores.	Pearl and Pot Ashes.	Lumber, Masts, &c.	Total of the Forest.
1791	290,208	230,000	350,000	1,210,000	$2,080,208
1803	630,000	460,000	735,000	2,800,000	4,850,000
1804	1,047, 05	327,931	642,000	2,548,000	4,654,466
1805	1,115,000	702,000	776,000	2,602,000	5,261,000
1806	930,000	409,000	935,000	2,537,000	4,861,000
1807	995,000	335,000	1,448,000	2,637,000	5,476,000

PRODUCE OF AGRICULTURE.

Year.	Animal Food &c.	Vegetable Food.	Tobacco.	Cotton.	Total of Agriculture.
1791	1,200,000	4,640,000	4,000,009	30,000	$ 9,870,000
1803	4,135,000	14,080,000	6,230,000	7,920,000	32,995,000
1804	4,284,568	12,080,684	6,000,048	7,404,117	33,385,262
1805	3,385,000	11,752,000	6,341,000	9,445,000	31,562,000
1806	3,274,000	11,050,000	6,572,000	8,532,000	32,375,000
1807	3,086,000	14,432,000	5,476,000	14,232,100	37,832,000

PRODUCE OF MANUFACTURES.

Year.	Domestic Manufactures.	Of Foreign Materials.	Total Manufactures.	Total of the Domestic Exports.
1791	600,000	400,009	1,093,320	$14,600,000
1803	790,000	565,000	1,356,000	42,335,000
1804	1,134,864	454,916	2,189,000	41,095,089
1805	1,579,000	721,000	2,300,000	42,387,000
1806	1,889,000	818,000	2,707,000	46,501,000
1807	1,652,000	468,000	2,120,000	48,700,000

Total of British Manufactures from the most approved statements, with the British Goods consumed in the United States, in 1807.

Materials.	*Annual value per estimate. 1807.*	*Persons employed. 1807.*	*Daily wages for good hands.*	*Profit on the capital.*	*Consumed in the United States, in 1806.*
	STERLING.		CENTS.	PER CENT.	DOLLARS.
Cotton	12,000,000	300,000	30 to 45	10 to 15	11,950,000
Woollen	14,000,000	360,000	20 to 40	10 to 12	4,500,000
Leather	10,000,000	100,000	30 to 40	10	2,600,000
Steel plate and plating	4,400,000	55,000	35 to 48	10 to 15	3,500,000
Iron, Copper, &c.	9,600,000	85,000	30 to 45	12 to 20	
Of flax	4,000,000	80,000	30 to 35	10 to 12	2,500,000
Silk	3,700,000	60,000	30 to 36	10 to 12	2,600,000
Hemp	2,600,000	50,000	38 to 40	10 to 15	1,000,000
Potteries	2,000,000	40,000	26 to 30	8 to 15	2,460,000
Glass	2,500,000	30,000	35 to 50	10 to 15	
Paper	200,000	10,000	38 to 45	12 to 16	1,000,000
Peltry, hats, &c.	300,000	20,000	30 to 40	12 to 18	
Breweries and all others	6,700,000	124,000	40	10 to 15	6,000,000
Pounds Sterling	72,000,000	1,304,000	Aver'd 40	Aver'd 12	38,110,000

Population of the United States CLASSED *and compared with that of England and Wales, for the year* 1807.

Classing of each Profession.	*Population of the U. S. 3 to a square mile.*		*Population of South Britain, 150 to a square mile.*	
PRODUCTIVE CLASS, OR NO. 1.	ACTIVE.	TOTAL.	ACTIVE.	TOTAL.
Sea and river fishermen	6,300	35,000	8,000	18,000
Agricultural labourers	2,000,000	3,641,362	1,800,000	2,600,000
Active seamen and half seamen	115,000	330,000	200,000	300,000
Mechanics and manufacturers	230,000	1,000,000	1,384,000	2,500,000
	3,358,000	4,906,362	3,392,000	5,418,000
STIMULATING CLASS, OR NO. 2.				
Liberal monied capitalists	50,000	200,000	100,000	300,000
Vigilant and liberal land proprietors,	100,000	400,000	150,000	500,000
Professional and scientific, active merchants, and all brisk circulators of their own money and of borrowed capital	150,000	500,000	300,000	950,000
CONSUMING CLASS, OR NO. 3.	–	350,000	–	2,350,000
Total,		6,556,362		9,518,000

Note. NUMBER 3, is made up chiefly of useless persons, standing armies, idle nobility, idle recluse, idle paupers, miserly and idle land and money monopolizers, gamblers, beggars, thieves, prostitutes, and all other vicious and unprofitable *drones in the Hive.*

The *stimulating* class or No. 2, contains many partial labourers in the *productive* line and some even of the *consuming* class are usefully employed but not enough to earn the price of the provisions they consume. The *total columns* contain the families and dependents on the active population. Our consuming class is much incumbered with superannuated slaves and of *freed* men of colour.—Fishing, ranks first *for subsistence only.*

Although the best European statistical information attainable, is made up, *in part*, from *estimates*, they are yet sufficient to establish a belief, that not more than one sixth of the whole number, or 1,600,000 persons are employed in agricultural labor in South Britain. Their wages have greatly increased by the late universal increase of all money, from twenty four cents in 1793 to thirty-eight cents, an average for South Britain in 1807. Their numbers actively employed in manufactures, are from 1,200,000 to 1,800,000; and their wages, *as stated*, will average 40 cents. The annual amount manufactured in G. Britain is equal to 350,000,000 of dollars; and the capital essential to all the expence, and the entire credits usually given by them equal to two years product, or to 700,000,000 of dollars.

The hands employed in Europe to fabricate for the consumption of one year for the United States, are about 200,000; of which near 65,000 are engaged in the cotton line; for which about 10,100,000 lbs. were requisite for the last year's stock.

On pursuing our enquiry, we are more confirmed in the belief, that very great benefits are to be realized by tranferring and extending this branch to all the most populous parts of the United States, even if a good commercial understanding should restore our former system of exchange with Europe for other articles. The difference between the price at which we could purchase our own raw cotton would be from 15 to 25 cents in common, and more as long as any misunderstandings may continue between us and our former correspondents in Europe. The 10 100,000 lbs. of cotton, that costs *at Manchester* 40 cents, would not average more than 20 cents at home, or 2,000,000 of dollars; but for the whole of our cotton branch we should require enough for two years purchase of the entire productions, or near 22,000,000 of dollars. As since the inventions of the *ingenious* Mr. Arkwright, joint stock associations are found better suited to the *cotton branch* than unconnected individual exertions. Nothing can be more favorable for our country, if every fact in relation be duly considered and embraced.

About 60,000 persons, who now do but little or *nothing*, in the United States, may be among the best qualified for this important branch of domestic employment: I mean women and children, of a cast that could not be so easily persuaded to engage in any other branch of social and useful industry. But the wages, which the peculiar circumstances already stated, would permit the managers to give, and the great neatness and order prevalent in a well constructed cotton factory, with a very little of the *old-fash-*

ioned feelings of '76, would soon do wonders; if, to follow the example of New York) other states, and the government of the United States should become sensible, that to loan monies in aid of useful manufactures, and particularly to joint stock associations, would be to act in conformity with the spirit of the constitution, by PROVIDING FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE.

If the general government would subscribe any sum not exceeding one third of the capital to any and every well organized institution for such purposes, and pay therefor in United States' stock, bearing a fair interest, but redeemable only in the public land offices; by such a plan, without the smallest burthen on the people, a threefold benefit would accrue: First, to the general treasury, in dividends on the manufactory stock; secondly, to the whole country, by the addition to an active capital now much wanted for these and other purposes; and thirdly, these United States stock certificates would enable the ready purchasers of Public Lands to be punctual in their future payments in a paper easy in transfer and safe from any such robberies as that at Cincinnati of the last year.

Perhaps the importance of the subject may authorise the following repetition.

First, it is a well authenticated fact that an average of at least ten per centum is gained on the stock now employed in the cotton line in Europe; where, for prime hands, at least 40 to 45 cents are paid; to which we might add the saving, or all the difference in the first cost of the raw material at 20 to 24 cents a pound; then add the 25 per centum for duty, freight, insurance, and all other charges; and the calculator will find that at least double wages can be paid, and yet a greater profit would accrue to the American joint stockholders than can be made by banking, or perhaps by any other sure and steady employment for the same capital, or twenty-two millions of dollars; which may hereafter be increased with the increasing population and the consequent demands of our citizens for the infinite variety of cotton articles now in use, and daily extending, as well from the caprice of fashion as for comfortable and necessary clothing.

It is indeed pleasing, *in these times*, to observe symptoms of returning patriotism. If all legislators were as fully aware of the modes by which the artful and ambitious seduce the affections of a people from correct principles they would not be so negligent as they too often are, and thus favor conspiracies against our envied republic. PENNSYLVANIA has recently lent money to extend her roads: NEW YORK has been as liberal in aid of her new manufactures; and she has also done what the short-sighted may regard with indifferent feelings: But nevertheless, it will prove true, that by her late respectful tribute to all those citizens of the United States, who died a lingering and painful death while in close confinement for their fidelity to our common country, she has added her strongest link to the bright chain of THE UNION, and raised to her own fame a monument that shall point to Heaven till the end of time.

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